On October 16, 2026, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals[1] addressed an issue of first impression for the Court: Is a religious organization that makes an employment decision based on its religious beliefs and another protected class, such as sex, race or national origin, exempt from liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)? The Court held that it is not.
The case, John Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, involves the application of Section 702(a) of Title VII, which exempts religious organizations from certain employment decisions based on religious beliefs. U.S. Circuit Judge Henry F. Floyd, writing for the majority, described the appeal as “the collision of employment non-discrimination statutes with statutory and constitutional protections for religiously affiliated employers.” [2]
The Facts
John Doe was hired by Catholic Relief Services (“CRS”) as an IT analyst in 2016. He worked in various IT positions until his resignation in 2024. At the time he was hired, Doe informed CRS that he is gay and married to a man. He enrolled in CRS’s group health benefits, with his husband as a dependent. However, five months later, CRS informed Doe that his husband’s enrollment was a mistake and that it would not extend health benefits to his husband because providing dependent benefits to Doe’s husband was contrary to CRS’s religious values.
The Claims
Doe filed suit against CRS in the District Court of Maryland, alleging several claims, including sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”). Prior to trial, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Doe on his discrimination claims under Title VII and the EPA. At trial, the jury found in his favor on his claim under MFEPA.
CRS’s Defenses
In arguing that it was not liable for discrimination, CRS relied on the Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations. Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect to that individual’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.[3] However, Title VII includes an exemption that allows religious organizations to give employment preference to members of their own religion. Section 702, which applies to all religious organizations, states:
This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.[4]
Title VII defines “religion” broadly to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief”.[5] Accordingly, the decision to employ individuals of a particular religion under § 2000e-1(a) has been interpreted to include the decision to terminate an employee whose conduct or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of the employer.
The Fourth Circuit’s Decision
At the outset of its analysis, the Court noted that CRS’s decision based on Doe’s sexual orientation “is discrimination on the basis of sex, because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being [gay] or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”[6] As a result, CRS’s decision disallowing health benefits to Doe’s spouse because of Doe’s sexual orientation presented a decision that was based both on CRS’s religious beliefs, as well as Doe’s sexual orientation. Having not previously addressed whether the exemption applies to an employment decision based on race and religion, sex and religion, or national origin and religion,[7] the Court relied on its prior reasoning. In Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, the Court analyzed the reach of the exemption for religious organizations and held that the exemption is limited “to one particular reason for [an] employment decision—that based upon religious preference,” and that the exemption “does not confer upon religious organizations a license to make those same decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.”[8]
In considering CRS’s actions, the Court concluded that “Title VII’s proscription of employment decisions based on race, sex, or national origin applies to religious organizations even when the decision is also motivated by religion.”[9] “In other words, Title VII’s exemption does not reflect a congressional intent that religious organizations be exempt from Title VII claims based on anything other than religion.”[10]
Thus, the Court held that Title VII “does not shield religious employers from liability for discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin even if the employment decision is also motivated by religious belief.”[11] According to the Court, to hold otherwise, “permits religious organizations to discriminate on any basis so long as a religious reason attended [and] would allow the exemption to swallow the rule, which would undermine rather than respect the remedial goals of Title VII.”[12]
What the Court’s Decision Means
Based on the Fourth Circuit’s decision, religious organizations are not exempt from Title VII if their religion-based employment decision is also motivated by the employee’s sex, color, race, or national origin. Religious institutions may still “favor co-religionists in hiring,” and “terminate an employee whose conduct or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of its employer,” provided the employment decision is not also based on the employee’s race, sex, color, or national origin.[13]
The Fourth Circuit is not alone in its interpretation of Title VII’s exemption. Its decision in Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs. follows the line of thinking expressed by other federal courts of appeals that have not allowed the religious exemption to include decisions based on other protected classes under Title VII.[14] The decision contains a lengthy dissent criticizing the ruling. If CRS appeals the Court’s decision, the question remains whether the U.S. Supreme Court will decide to hear the case. Regardless, for now the Fourth Circuit’s decision is precedent for federal courts (and, therefore, employers) within the Fourth Circuit.
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[1] The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals of federal district courts in South Carolina, North Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[2] Doe v. Cath. Relief Servs., — F.4th —, No. 25-1569, 2026 WL 3091963 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 2026).
[3] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
[4] U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). In addition to Section 702, which covers all religious organizations, Section 703(e)(2), in part does the same, but also contains a specific carve out for religious educational institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (permitting religious educational institutions “to hire and employ employees of a particular religion”).
[5] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
[6] Doe, at *4
[7] Id.
[8] Id. (citing, Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985)).
[9] Id. (emphasis added).
[10] Id., at *4
[11] Id., at *3
[12] Id., at *6
[13] Id.
[14] The Court noted that it broke “no new ground with this rule,” citing cases from the Sixth Circuit, Third Circuit, and Ninth Circuit. Id.



